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Abstract
In this paper, we conduct a pan-European eﬃciency analysis to investigate the
performance of European railways with a particular focus on economies of verti-
cal integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated railways realize economies
of scope and, thus, produce railway services with a higher level of eﬃciency. To
determine whether joint or separate production is more eﬃcient, we apply a Data
Envelopment Analysis super-eﬃciency bootstrapping model which relates the ef-
ﬁciency for integrated production to a reference set consisting of separated ﬁrms
which use a diﬀerent production technology. We ﬁnd that for a majority of Euro-
pean railways economies of scope exist.
Keywords: Eﬃciency, Vertical Integration, Railway Industry
JEL-Classiﬁcation: L22, L43, L92
∗Wissenschaftliches Institut f¨ ur Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste, ++49 2224 9225 88,
c.growitsch@wik.org
†Leuphana University Lueneburg, ++49 4131 6772324, wetzel@uni.leuphana.de
11 Introduction
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, European national governments and the EU Com-
mission decided to introduce competitive elements into the European railway industry.
The railway sector had been performing poorly because of high subsidy requirements and
an increasingly falling market share compared to other modes of transportation. The
predominant means of restructuring the industry had been to open markets and to sep-
arate infrastructure from operations (Nash and Rivera-Trujillo, 2004). The rationale for
separation was that it would provide discriminatory-free access to the infrastructure for
transport operators and enhance competition within the railway industry. More competi-
tion, in turn, would increase eﬃciency and demand for railway services and, hence, raise
economic welfare (Commision of the European Communities, 1996).
However, in many European countries, vertically integrated ﬁrms still own the rail-
way infrastructure and participate in the transport segment. Although these ﬁrms are
obliged to grant infrastructure access to third parties and to organizationally separate the
infrastructure from the transportation business, there is a potential for market foreclo-
sure and third-party discrimination. An expanded institutional unbundling in the sense
of complete ownership separation could eliminate this problem. Some European coun-
tries, like the United Kingdom and Sweden, have already implemented new institutional
arrangements; in these countries a state-controlled ﬁrm owns the infrastructure and pro-
vides network access and services to numerous competitive transportation ﬁrms. In other
countries, such as Germany or Austria, the railway sector is still dominated by integrated
incumbents, who argue that an institutional separation would diminish the advantages
of vertical integration and would, therefore, not be eﬀective in raising economic welfare.
Economies of scope provided by this kind of vertical integration could result either from
technical advantages or from transactional advantages of joint production. The shared
use of headquarters services such as management, marketing or communication services
could lower production costs within an integrated structure compared with a separated
organizational structure, for example. If such economies of scope exist, integrated organi-
zation would be eﬃcient, whereas a separation with competition in transport operations
would be advantageous if economies of scope do not exist.
Following this argument, a decision for or against institutional separation necessitates
an analysis of potential economies of scope within the railway sector. Previous research
(e.g., Bitzan, 2003; Ivaldi and McCullough, 2004) addressed this issue without actually
comparing diﬀerent production technologies and based on only a single country. In this
paper, we conduct a multi-country analysis to investigate the performance of European
railways, with particular focus on economies of scope. Our unique dataset consists of 54
railway companies from 27 European countries, observed over the ﬁve-year period from
22000 to 2004. The companies represent a variety of ﬁrm sizes, input-output combinations
and, most importantly, institutional settings, namely integrated railways and unbundled
network and train operators. Unbundled infrastructure ﬁrms (so-called infrastructure
managers) own a network and sell network capacity to transportation ﬁrms but do not
oﬀer any own transportation services. They coordinate the traﬃc on the network aiming
at optimal capacity utilization. Unbundled passenger and freight operators oﬀer pas-
senger and freight services, respectively, and depend on network access provided by the
infrastructure managers. Integrated ﬁrms, ﬁnally, oﬀer all activities from a single source.
To test the hypothesis that integrated railways realize economies of scope, we analyze
the technical eﬃciency of integrated companies compared to unbundled railways by ap-
plying a distance function model. In contrast to previous research, this allows us to
refrain from determining any speciﬁc ﬁrm objectives, such as proﬁt maximization, which is
crucial for a sample of regulated companies.1In addition, distance functions do not require
information on input and output prices, so international comparisons are facilitated.
Our analysis adopts a two-step approach, which is innovative in its application, not just
for the railway sector, but for network industries in general. In the ﬁrst step, we estimate
the technical eﬃciency of integrated and non-integrated railways using the non-parametric
data envelopment analysis (DEA), which allows us to avoid any speciﬁc assumptions about
the underlying technology’s functional form. In order to make a set of non-integrated
railways comparable to the integrated railways, we follow a suggestion by Morita (2003)
and construct virtually integrated ﬁrms from samples of diﬀerent specialized ﬁrms. In
the second step, we determine whether joint or separate production is more eﬃcient by
applying a DEA super-eﬃciency model, which relates the eﬃciency for the integrated
production to a reference set consisting of the separate production technology. The major
methodological advantage of this procedure is that it enables us to compare two diﬀerent
production technologies, rather than analyzing one production frontier derived from all
ﬁrms, as was done in most previous research. While we provide general empirical results
rather than a precise ﬁrm-level quantiﬁcation of economies of scope, an application to
the railway industry - as well as to other network sectors, such as electricity, gas and
telecommunications - aids understanding of industry structure and possible eﬀects of
governmental policies.
This paper aims to ﬁll a void in previous research and empirically analyzes the question
of whether economies of scope in European railways exist. The outline for the remainder of
this paper is as follows: The theoretical foundations and previous literature are presented
in section 2. Section 3 discusses methodology. Section 4 introduces the modeling approach
1 For discussion of distance functions in favor of cost or revenue functions, see Coelli and Perelman
(2000) and section three of this paper.
3and describes the data. Estimation results are presented in section 5. Section 6 contains
conclusions and highlights policy implications and directions for future research.
2 Economies of scope in railways – theoretical back-
ground and previous research
The primary argument against separation in the railway industry has been the potential
existence of signiﬁcant economies of scope (e.g., Bureau of Transport and Regional Eco-
nomics (BTRE), 2003). However, empirical evidence for such economies in the industry
is scarce. This section provides a theoretical overview of the conditions of economies of
scope and their possible sources in railway industries, followed by a review of previous
research on eﬃciency and scope economies in railways and a presentation of the ability of
non-parametric frontier techniques to measure economies of scope.
Economies of scope arise, in general, when cost savings can be realized as a result of a
joint production of goods. Hence, it is more eﬃcient for a single ﬁrm to produce a certain
output vector than for two or more ﬁrms to produce the same output vector separately.
Technically, economies of scope occur when the costs of producing a speciﬁc output vector
Y jointly are lower than the costs of producing the same output vector separately under
the restriction of orthogonal nonnegative output vectors (Yi) (Baumol et al., 1988):
C (Y ) <
m X
i=1




Diseconomies of scope occur when that inequality is reversed. In the case of railway pro-
duction, the output vector may be divided into infrastructure management (YI), passenger
transportation (YP) and freight transportation (YF). Economies of scope exist when the
inequality
C (YI,YP,YF) < C (YI,0,0) + C (0,YP,0) + C (0,0,YF) (2)
holds and the separate production of outputs comes at higher cost than joint produc-
tion. If this applies to railway production, an integrated market solution with only one
ﬁrm is favorable to an institutional arrangement wherein the infrastructure manager is
institutionally separated from passenger and freight operators.
The primary argument in favor of economies of scope in the railway industry is that
of potential transaction costs savings within an integrated organization: Railway ser-
vices are characterized by a high level of technological and transactional interdependence
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management, timetable coordination and investment planning, as well as everyday op-
erational decisions on traﬃc coordination, like train length, train speed or emergency
service. Technologically, all these activities can be organized within a hierarchical (inte-
grated) structure as well as within a contractual market structure among separated ﬁrms.
Depending on the amount of transaction costs, one or the other has to be preferred. 2
Supporters of an integrated structure argue that, within a separated structure with
several independent operators, the number of contract negotiations as well as technical
and organizational interfaces will increase, increasing transaction costs.While this argu-
ment is less likely to hold for real-time traﬃc coordination, it may be a consideration in
long-term capacity allocation; real-time traﬃc coordination costs do not depend on the
number of operators on the network but on the number of train movements. As long as
only one network ﬁrm – either integrated or separated – is responsible for this production
stage, no signiﬁcant transaction cost diﬀerences should be expected (Knieps, 2004). On
the other hand, the process of identifying the most eﬃcient institutional arrangement for
long-term capacity allocation is rather sophisticated. Long-term investment decisions in
particular may diﬀer between one integrated and several separated ﬁrms since railway
operations depend heavily on exact coordination between the infrastructure and oper-
ations section. Every decision on rolling stock or wheel design aﬀects the track design
and track maintenance requirements, and vice versa (Pittman, 2005). For example, a
passenger operator investing in high-speed trains must be sure that the track system is
capable of providing high-speed transportation, while the infrastructure provider has to
know what kind of capacity is needed at what time and at what place. Such coordination
is information-intensive, and whether this interaction can be provided at lower transac-
tion costs within an integrated or separated structure cannot be easily determined. On
ﬁrst glance, the number of participating ﬁrms in a separated system gives reason to favor
the integrated system. However, the ﬂow of information in a widely branched ﬁrm bears
signiﬁcant risks of increasing amounts of information and, hence, transaction costs.
Related to this issue, another problem of long-term capacity allocation can arise as
a result of diﬀerent investment incentives within the two possible institutional arrange-
ments. For example, an integrated infrastructure provider and transport operator has
an incentive to invest in network infrastructure in order to prevent his rolling stock from
wear and tear. In a separated system, with other ﬁrms owning the rolling stock, this
incentive disappears (Mulder et al., 2005). Similarly, a separated transport operator has
no incentive to invest in his rolling stock simply to reduce the wear and tear on the tracks.
Thus, underinvestment may occur on either side, raising costs in the long run. Therefore,
2 For a detailed description of transaction costs theory see Williamson (1975; 1985).
5incentives between the infrastructure provider and the transport operators have to be ef-
ﬁciently coordinated. For example, track access charges should consider cost-inﬂuencing
investments on either side: An infrastructure owner has an incentive to invest in the net-
work if he gets paid for it via higher access charges, while transport operators have an
incentive to invest in rolling stock if they can thereby secure lower access charges. Such a
system of long-term investment coordination within a separated structure certainly leads
to more (cost intensive) interactions and negotiations between the production stages; how-
ever, within an integrated organization the lack of competition and the direct monetary
connection between performance and counter-performance may result in an ineﬃcient and
similarly cost-intensive resource allocation. The question of which eﬀect is being dominant
remains hard to answer.
These issues illustrate the complexity of the interdependencies between infrastructure
and operations and the diﬃculty in judging for or against economies of scope. Thus, the
optimal institutional arrangement in the railway sector becomes an empirical question.
Studies with speciﬁc focus on vertical separation and economies of scope are rare. In
a 2003 paper Bitzan used a data set of 30 U.S. Class I freight railways covering the years
1983-97 to evaluate the cost implications of competition in the US rail freight industry
(Bitzan, 2003). The results, which were obtained by estimating a translog quasi-cost
function, indicated economies of vertical integration, suggesting that vertical separation
leads to increased costs. However, considering diﬀerent technological characteristics in
other countries Bitzan restricted his ﬁndings to the U.S. freight railway industry. Bitzan
pointed out that the European railway systems in particular, with their usually much
smaller networks and higher proportion of passengers within the combined passenger and
freight operations, may lead to other cost implications of competition and/or separation.
Ivaldi and McCullough (2004) used a comparable data set of 22 U.S. Class I freight
railways covering the years 1978-2001 to evaluate the technological feasibility of separating
vertically integrated ﬁrms into an infrastructure company and competing operating ﬁrms.
The results, which were obtained by estimating a generalized McFadden cost function,
indicated vertical as well as horizontal economies of scope in a technological sense. The
authors stated that vertical separation may lead to a 20-40 percent cost disadvantage
against a vertically integrated system and to even greater disadvantages if bulk and general
freight operations are also separated. Observing only integrated ﬁrms in the sample,
Ivaldi and McCullough restricted their ﬁndings to pure technological eﬀects of separation;
neither the eﬀects of transaction costs in an integrated system compared to a separated
system, nor the eﬀects of competition were assessed. Like Bitzan, they considered rail
system characteristics in other countries to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent and, thus, restricted
their ﬁndings to the U.S. rail freight system.
Cantos-Sanchez (2001) estimated a translog cost function from a panel of 12 European
6state-owned railways for the period 1973-90. His ﬁndings reported cost substitutability
between track infrastructure and passenger operations but cost complementarity between
track infrastructure and freight operations. That is, higher track costs lead to lower
passenger operation costs as well as higher freight operation costs. This result indicated
diseconomies of scope between passenger and freight operations; however, considering
the risk that separated ﬁrms do not account for these interdependencies, this ﬁnding
also suggested that there are beneﬁts to vertical integration, as Nash and Rivera-Trujillo
(2004) stated.
A recent study on European railways by Friebel et al. (2004) investigated the impact
of policy reforms on 12 European national railway ﬁrms. By applying a production fron-
tier model they compared passenger traﬃc eﬃciency for the period 1980-2000, during
which most of the European railway markets were reformed. The authors found that the
gradual implementation of reforms improved eﬃciency, whereas multiple reforms imple-
mented simultaneously had, at best, neutral eﬀects. Controlling for the eﬀect of separation
Friebel et al. showed that there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in eﬃciency between fully
integrated companies and organizationally separated ﬁrms, but that full institutional sep-
aration had a positive eﬀect on eﬃciency, when the United Kingdom is excluded from the
dataset. The results also indicated that, in general, smaller railway ﬁrms (ﬁrm size being
measured in terms of network length) improved eﬃciency more than larger ﬁrms did.
Overall, previous research on the economics of vertical integration in railways has
shown that the impact of scope economies on the eﬃciency of railway systems remains
ambiguous. What’s more, several important issues, such as diﬀerent production technolo-
gies in integrated and separated organizational arrangements and limitations resulting
from speciﬁc behavioral assumptions, have not yet been addressed. Therefore, in order to
estimate scope economies in a technological and, especially, transactional sense, we ap-
ply data envelopment analysis (DEA). Our pan-European data set incorporates railway
ﬁrms from 27 European countries for the period 2000-04. In contrast to data in previous
studies, the data includes not only integrated railway ﬁrms, but separated ﬁrms, diﬀer-
entiated between infrastructure managers, passenger operators and freight operators. To
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study using this kind of data in a European railway eﬃ-
ciency comparison. Further, our estimation technique compares two diﬀerent production
frontiers of separated and integrated ﬁrms, rather than analyzing one frontier derived
from all ﬁrms, as was done in most previous work, and thus, incorporates diﬀerent pro-
duction technologies. Variations of this technique can be found in Ferrier et al. (1993),
Prior (1996), Fried et al. (1998), Prior and Sola (2000), Kittelsen and Magnussen (2003)
and Cummins et al. (2003), which evaluated scope and diversiﬁcation economies in the
banking, hospital, health care and insurance sectors.
73 Methodology
To specify a multiple-output multiple-input production technology, we apply the distance
function approach proposed by Shephard (1953; 1970). Compared to other representa-
tions of technologies, such as cost or revenue functions, this approach requires no speciﬁc
behavioral objectives, such as cost minimization or proﬁt maximization, which are likely
to be violated in the case of partly state-owned and highly regulated industries like Eu-
ropean railways (Coelli and Perelman, 2000).
Distance functions can be diﬀerentiated into input-oriented and output-oriented. The
input orientation assumes that the output set is determined by exogenous factors and,
hence, that the inﬂuence of ﬁrms on output quantities is limited; the output orientation
assumes exactly the same for the input set. For railways, both versions can be appropriate.
In support of the input-oriented approach, one could argue that the demand for outputs
is highly inﬂuenced by macro-economic factors (e.g. customer density) as well as by
state-controlled public transport requirements. This argument particularly applies to
several incumbent railway ﬁrms which still provide almost 100 percent of the rail transport
services in their respective country. On the other hand, a major argument in favor of
an output-oriented approach is the existence of barely controllable input factors, e.g.,
political inﬂuence on capital expenditures (Coelli and Perelman, 1999). However, since
we apply a constant return-to-scale estimation approach, there is no need to decide on
the orientation as input-oriented distance measure equals the output-oriented distance
measure in reciprocal terms.
By modeling a production technology as an input distance function3 oone can investi-
gate how much the input vector can be proportionally reduced while holding the output
vector ﬁxed. Assuming that the technology satisﬁes the standard properties listed in F¨ are
and Primont (1995), the input distance function can be deﬁned as:
DI (x,y) = max{θ : (x/θ) ∈ L(y)}, (3)
where the input set L(y) represents the set of all input vectors x that can produce the
output vector y. The function is non-decreasing, positively linearly homogeneous and
concave in x, and increasing in y (Lovell et al., 1994). From x ∈ L(y) follows DI(x,y) ≥ 1.
A value equal to unity identiﬁes the respective ﬁrm as being fully eﬃcient and located on
the frontier of the input set. Values greater than unity belong to input sets within the
frontier, indicating ineﬃcient ﬁrms.
In order to estimate the distance functions and obtain information about technical
3 The output-oriented model is deﬁned in a similar way (e.g. Coelli and Perelman, 1999).
8eﬃciency and scope economies of European railways, we use data envelopment analysis
(DEA), a method introduced by Charnes et al. (1978). DEA is a non-parametric approach
which constructs a piece-wise linear production frontier that envelopes all observed data
points. This production frontier can be estimated either constant or variable returns
to scale (CRS and VRS, respectively). The CRS approach assumes that the observed
ﬁrms can alter their sizes and, thus, identiﬁes ﬁrms departing from optimal scale as inef-
ﬁcient. In contrast, the VRS approach compares ﬁrms within similar scales, accounting
for eﬃciency variation based on scale diﬀerences. Although the VRS approach allows an
eﬃciency comparison corrected for scale inﬂuences, we follow the CRS approach because
an eﬃciency comparison should consider the long-term perspective, including increasing
European deregulation and competition. Country-speciﬁc regulation and political inﬂu-
ence preventing scale optimization in the short-run will diminish in the long-run, so ﬁrms
departing from optimal scale should be identiﬁed as ineﬃcient. Further, using the VRS
approach could result in the number of comparable ﬁrms within a speciﬁc range of size
becoming very low; and, in the extreme, when no ﬁrm of comparable size exists, a VRS
DEA approach always identiﬁes the benchmarked ﬁrm as 100 percent eﬃcient. Finally,
from the technical perspective, the VRS assumption may lead to infeasibility of the super-
eﬃciency model used in the second stage of our analysis.4 Nevertheless, for reasons of
comparison and consideration of the possible inﬂuence of scale eﬃciency on our estimation
results, we also calculate the VRS eﬃciency scores in the ﬁrst stage of our analysis.
Taking it as given that the ﬁrms use K inputs and M outputs the CRS input-oriented
frontier is calculated by solving the linear optimization program for each of N ﬁrms:5
maxθ,
s.t. −yi + Y λ ≥ 0,
xi/θ − Xλ ≥ 0,
λ ≥ 0,
(4)
where X is the K ×N matrix of inputs and Y is the M ×N matrix of outputs. The i-th
ﬁrm’s input and output vectors are represented by xi and yi respectively. λ is a N × 1
vector of constants and θ is the input distance measure. As deﬁned earlier in this section,
this measure indicates a ﬁrm’s technical eﬃciency or ineﬃciency.6
To analyze economies of scope in the railway sector, we calculate so-called super-
eﬃciency scores in a second step. Super-eﬃciency measures can be obtained by calculating
4 For a discussion of infeasibility of super-eﬃciency models under VRS see Zhu (2003).
5 In order to calculate the input-oriented frontier under VRS, the convexity constraint N1’ = 1 must
be added.
6 Note that this is the Shepard measure of technical eﬃciency. The corresponding Farrell measure
can be obtained by taking the reciprocal of the Shepard distance function (see Wilson, 2005).
9the eﬃciency of one group of observations relative to a production technology deﬁned by
another reference group of observations; that is, we compare the eﬃciency of integrated
railway ﬁrms relative to the eﬃciency frontier of non-integrated railway ﬁrms. In order
to obtain a comparable set of non-integrated ﬁrms, we follow a suggestion from Morita
(2003) and construct virtually integrated ﬁrms from samples of diﬀerent separated ﬁrms.
Assume, for example, that there are two kinds of products, A and B, which could be
produced separately in two ﬁrms or jointly in one ﬁrm. There are nA ﬁrms producing
only A, nB ﬁrms producing only B and nAB ﬁrms producing both A and B. These ﬁrms
can be compared by combining the nA ﬁrms with the nB ﬁrms, giving a number of nA×nB
virtual ﬁrms. These virtual ﬁrms use the same inputs to produce the same outputs as the
nAB ﬁrms, but producing them under an alternative production technology.
For J integrated ﬁrms and S non-integrated ﬁrms, the input distance function for an
integrated ﬁrm j relative to the non-integrated ﬁrms’ frontier can be deﬁned as:
DS (xj,yj) = max
￿
θ : (xj/θ) ∈ L
S (yj)
￿
, j = 1,2,...,J (5)
where LS (yj) represents the set of all input vectors x of the non-integrated ﬁrms that can
produce the output vector yj. In contrast to a company’s input distance function value
calculated within its own group (which is greater than or equal to unity), the relative
eﬃciency value calculated for a reference set of the other companies’ group can take
values between zero and inﬁnity.
The corresponding CRS super-eﬃciency model is calculated by solving the linear op-
timization program J times for each of the integrated ﬁrms:
maxθj,
s.t. −yj + Ysλs ≥ 0, j = 1,2,...,J
xj/θj − Xsλs ≥ 0, s = 1,2,...,S
λs ≥ 0,
(6)
where Xs is the K×N input matrix and Ys the M×N output matrix of all non-integrated
ﬁrms; xj is the input vector and yj the output vector of the evaluated integrated ﬁrm, and
λs is a N×1 vector of constants of the separated ﬁrms. If the input distance function value,
i.e. the super-eﬃciency score, for the evaluated ﬁrm θj is lower than unity, the integrated
ﬁrm is dominant over (more eﬃcient than) the non-integrated frontier, whereas a value
greater than unity indicates a dominance of the non-integrated ﬁrms‘ frontier over the
evaluated ﬁrm. However, if for the integrated ﬁrm the input distance function value
relative to its own group θ is also greater than unity, the ﬁrm is also dominated by its
10own group’s frontier. Hence, considering only the super-eﬃciency scores is not suﬃcient to
identify the favorable technology or the existence of economies or diseconomies of scope.
Consequently, as suggested by Cummins et al. (2003) we measure the distance between
the two production frontiers by calculating the ratio of the eﬃciency and super-eﬃciency
scores.
To illustrate this, consider non-integrated and integrated ﬁrms producing a single out-
put with two inputs. The two input production frontiers are shown in ﬁgure 1, where the
production frontier for the integrated ﬁrms is labeled Lj(y), and the production frontier
for non-integrated ﬁrms is labeled Ls(y).7 Fully eﬃcient ﬁrms operate on their respec-
tive frontier and show distance function (eﬃciency) values relative to their own group
equalling unity. Economies (diseconomies) of scope for all observations can be identiﬁed
if the production frontiers do not intersect and the integrated (non-integrated) frontier is
placed closer to the origin. If the two production frontiers exhibit an intersection point as
shown in Figure 1, economies of scope for some observations and diseconomies of scope
for other observations can be identiﬁed.











For example, assume an integrated ﬁrm operating at point A in Figure 1. The distance
function value relative to the integrated frontier is θ = 0A/0D > 1, and the distance
function value relative to the separated frontier, which is θj = 0A/0B > 1, indicate this
ﬁrm is dominated by its own and the other group’s frontier. In order to measure which
frontier is placed closer to the origin and to test if economies or diseconomies of scope
7 Figure 1 and its description follow Cummins et al. (2003).











Since the distance function value of point A relative to the integrated frontier is greater
than its distance function value calculated with respect to the separated frontier, the ratio
from formula 7 is greater than unity, indicating that the integrated (”own”) frontier is
placed closer to the origin. Hence, for this ﬁrm, economies of scope can be identiﬁed. The
opposite case – diseconomies of scope – can be shown for an integrated ﬁrm operating at
point E. While both distance function values – that relative to its own frontier θ = 0E/0F
and that relative to the other group’s frontier θj = 0E/0G – are greater than unity, the
ratio ˆ θ = θ/θj = 0G/0F is smaller than unity, since the separated frontier is placed closer
to the origin than is the integrated frontier. In summary, if the ratio is greater (lower)
than unity, a ﬁrm’s own frontier dominates (is dominated by) the other group’s frontier
for the observed production point. Hence, for integrated ﬁrms, a ratio greater than unity
indicates economies of scope, and a ratio lower than unity indicates diseconomies of scope.
Since DEA eﬃciency measures are only point estimators calculated within a ﬁnite
sample, they are highly sensitive to sampling variations and errors in the data and lack
common statistical properties. In order to overcome this shortcoming, we apply a boot-
strap procedure. Introduced by Efron (1979), bootstrapping is based on the idea that,
when the original observed sample mimics the underlying population, every random draw
from this sample with replacement can be treated as a sample from the underlying popula-
tion itself. Bootstrapping is used when the original sampling distribution of the estimator
of interest, e.g., of the eﬃciency measures, is unknown. In general, the bootstrapping
of our eﬃciency estimates can be described as follows: We ﬁrst compute the eﬃciency
measure ˆ θi for each ﬁrm by DEA from the observed sample. Next, we generate a b-th
(b = 1,2,...,B) bootstrap sample θ∗
b of size n with replacement from ˆ θi, i = 1,...,n, and
calculate the bootstrap estimate ˆ θ∗
b by using DEA. This procedure is repeated B times
to obtain a set of estimates ˆ θ∗
b, b = 1,2...,B. Based on this sampling distribution, the
statistical properties of the estimated eﬃciency measures can be inferred.8
One major drawback of the outlined procedure is that it assumes a continuous true dis-
tribution F. However, especially in small samples with a large number of units identiﬁed
as being fully eﬃcient, the empirical distribution ˆ F of the eﬃciency scores is discontinuous
with a positive probability mass at θ = 1. Hence, ˆ F provides an inconsistent estimator of
F (Cummins et al., 2003). This problem can be solved with a smoothed bootstrap pro-
cedure, developed and extended by Simar and Wilson (1998; 2000), where the empirical
8 For more details on the bootstrap, see Efron (1979) or Efron and Tibshirani (1993).
12distribution ˆ F is smoothed using a Gaussian kernel density estimator. In our analysis we
use this bootstrap procedure to estimate the bias and variance of the DEA eﬃciency esti-
mates, and to construct conﬁdence intervals. As recommended by Hall (1986) we choose
B=1000 bootstrap replications. 9
4 Modeling approach and data description
The data set consists of 54 railway ﬁrms from 27 European countries throughout the
period 2000-2004. Considering every year as an independent observation, we receive a
sample of 152 observations in total.10 The data was taken primarily from the railway
statistics published by the Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer (2004; 2005) and
combined with information from the companies’ annual reports and companies’ statistics.
The ﬁrms are divided into four diﬀerent groups: Integrated ﬁrms, infrastructure man-
agers, passenger operators and freight operators. Every group sells a diﬀerent type of
product, with the integrated ﬁrms oﬀering all activities from a single source. The essen-
tial activity in railway operations is the infrastructure management, which forms an indis-
pensable requirement for transportation services. Infrastructure management is oﬀered by
either an infrastructure manager or an integrated ﬁrm and includes maintaining tracks,
railway stations or signal facilities as well as schedule monitoring and system control.
The infrastructure manager coordinates train movements, provides emergency service for
defective transport devices and develops time tables. In short, the infrastructure manager
provides and sells network access and services to the transportation ﬁrms, subject to the
condition of optimal capacity utilization. Therefore, we use the variable train-km driven
on the network as an output measure for infrastructure managers.11 The second activity
in railway operations is transportation, which can be distinguished between passenger and
freight transportation. Transportation is provided by passenger operators, freight oper-
ators or integrated ﬁrms. Since revenues for passenger operators depend on the number
of passengers and the distance traveled, we use the variable passenger-km as an output
measure. The freight operators’ revenues depend on the amount and distance of tonnes
9 For details of the procedure, please refer to Simar and Wilson (1998; 2000).
10 The diﬀerence between 270 observations having full data coverage and the lower number of 152 de
facto observations results from market entries that occurred later than 2000 and missing data, mainly
in 2004. Assuming every year as an independent observation includes eﬀects of technical progress and
catching-up in the eﬃciency scores. However, long asset life in relation to the rather short observed time
period of ﬁve years suggests these eﬀects are negligible (Aﬀuso et al., 2002).
11 The data on train-kms driven on the network was published ﬁrst for the year 2003 by the Union
Internationale des Chemins de Fer (UIC). If available, the data for preceding years was taken from the
annual reports. If not available, the train-km values of the biggest passenger and freight operators in the
speciﬁc country where taken to approximate the value.
13transported. Hence, the corresponding output variable freight tonne-km is used.
We specify two diﬀerent models for input variables. While the ﬁrst model, Model I, is
based only on physical measures for the input factors, the second model, Model II, also
takes a monetary ﬁgure into account. In Model I, number of employees, number of rolling
stock and network length are used as physical measures for labor and capital input. In
Model II, the ”physical” variables number of employees and number of rolling stock are
replaced by the monetary variable operating expenditure (OPEX). This variable represents
the total operating expenses, including the costs of staﬀ, materials, external charges, taxes,
depreciation, value adjustments and provisions for contingencies. Although this variable
already includes capital costs, we still use the variable network length as a proxy for
capital stock. We consider network length, since it is a long-lived asset, as a quasi-ﬁxed
input mainly built in the past and ﬁnanced by capital grants from the government.12
Furthermore, it reﬂects the cost impact of diﬀerences in network structure and density
(Smith, 2006).
Both models have advantages and disadvantages. The use of physical measures for
international comparison neglects the diﬀerences in relative factor prices among the coun-
tries, while using monetary values raises the problem of diﬀerences in price levels, ac-
counting rules and currency conversion. To limit this problem, we convert the ﬁnancial
data of operating costs into an artiﬁcial common currency, the purchasing power stan-
dard (PPS). By applying purchasing power parities provided by Eurostat (2005) instead
of conventional exchange rates, we account not only for currency conversion but also for
diﬀerences in price levels and purchasing power among the countries. Nevertheless, the
problem of varying accounting standards among the countries remains. Therefore, we
estimate both models and check for diﬀerences by comparing the results.
While all described input and output variables for integrated ﬁrms are part of their
corresponding production technology, the variable set for the non-integrated ﬁrms – pas-
senger operators, freight operators and infrastructure managers – diﬀer by their type of
activity. In order to estimate economies of scope, we use the parameter values of non-
integrated ﬁrms to construct ”virtually” integrated ﬁrms, which are comparable to the
actually integrated ﬁrms; every infrastructure manager is combined with every passenger
operator and every freight operator by accumulating their individual parameter values.
A new group of ”virtually” integrated ﬁrms is generated using a comparable production
technology since those ”virtually” integrated ﬁrms share the same inputs and produce the
same outputs as the actually integrated ﬁrms. Furthermore, combining separated ﬁrms
from diﬀerent countries allows representations of the best possible combinations from a
12 This approach has been used frequently in previous literature. See Cantos et al. (2002) for a short
review.
14technological perspective. It limits the inﬂuence of country-speciﬁc conditions within the
”virtually” integrated ﬁrms, additionally. An example of how the ”virtually” integrated
ﬁrms are constructed from the data is given in Table 1.
Table 1: Construction of a ”virtually” integrated ﬁrm from separated ﬁrms
Input variables Output variables















Infrastructure manager 10 – 60 100 600 – –
Passenger operator 40 20 50 – – 300 –
Freight operator 30 30 40 – – – 200
”Virtually” integrated 80 50 150 100 600 300 200
Tables 2 and 3 show the summary statistics of the data used in each model, classiﬁed
for integrated ﬁrms and ”virtually” integrated ﬁrms. The descriptive statistics between
the integrated and ”virtually” integrated ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent because of some
very large integrated ﬁrms within the data set. We will control for this scale diﬀerences and
their potential inﬂuence on eﬃciency results in section 5. The number of observations
of integrated ﬁrms diﬀers slightly between the estimated models – 75 observations for
Model I and 73 observations for Model II – because of missing data. The observations
of ”virtually” integrated ﬁrms in Model I are generated by combining 33 observations of
infrastructure managers with 16 observations of passenger operators and 11 observations
of freight operators. On the country level, we combine infrastructure managers from 10
countries with passenger operators from 4 countries and freight operators from 5 countries.
In total, we obtain a number of 5808 ”virtually” integrated ﬁrms for Model I.
For Model II, 23 observations of infrastructure managers from 10 countries, 27 obser-
vations of passenger operators from 5 countries, and 8 observations of freight operators
from 4 countries are combined for a total number of 4968 ”virtually” integrated ﬁrms.
Again, the diﬀerence in the numbers is due to missing data. To eliminate extreme virtual
input-output combinations, we adjust the sub-sample of ”virtually” integrated ﬁrms for
outliers by applying the method suggested by Hadi (1992; 1994), which identiﬁes multi-
ple outliers in multivariate data. For Model I, 2508 observations were dropped, leaving
3330 observations of ”virtually” integrated ﬁrms. Data for Model II is adjusted for 2160
15outliers, leaving a total of 2808 observations of ”virtually” integrated ﬁrms.13
Table 2: Model I – Summary statistics
Integrated ﬁrms ”Virtually” integrated ﬁrms
Mean Max Min Mean Max Min
No. of employees 50517 249251 952 12870 36192 3465
No. of rolling stock 40351 219574 223 4981 11893 747
Network length (in km) 7331 36588 180 4665 9882 2047
Passenger-km (in millions) 11494 74459 126 4653 6621 2204
Tonne-km (in millions) 14258 76815 14 4952 13120 107
Train-km (in thousands) 134764 988200 2382 63158 128000 22667
No. of observations 75 3300
Table 3: Model II – Summary statistics
Integrated ﬁrms ”Virtually” integrated ﬁrms
Mean Max Min Mean Max Min
OPEX (in millions of PPS) 3281 29669 79 1439 3927 329
Network length (in km) 7474 36588 180 4055 5854 2273
Passenger-km (in millions) 11779 74459 126 4795 14666 7
Tonne-km (in millions) 14400 76815 14 5854 13120 456
Train-km (in thousands) 137999 988200 2382 45151 64341 36442
No. of observations 73 2808
5 Results
In this section, we present the results of the estimated models by, ﬁrst, analyzing the
technical eﬃciency results obtained by the DEA bootstrap procedure, then extending the
discussion to the evaluation of contingent economies of scope.
13 This large number of identiﬁed outliers results from a high fraction of ”unrealistic” virtual in-
put/output combinations, such as combinations of very large infrastructure managers with small passen-
ger operators.
16Analysis of the DEA bootstrap estimations (Table 4) allows several conclusions to
be drawn. For both models, the bias-corrected distance function values are, on average,
greater than the original eﬃciency scores, indicating that a standard DEA approach with-
out a bootstrap procedure tends to overestimate eﬃciency in our sample.14 For Model
I (Model II), the average distance function value for the integrated ﬁrms is corrected by
about 15 percent (7 percent) and the average distance function value for the ”virtually” in-
tegrated ﬁrms is corrected by about 2 percent (1 percent), suggesting that bias-correction
especially in small, data sensitive samples is essential for correct eﬃciency results.
Table 4: Summary statistics of original and bias-corrected distance func-
tion (eﬃciency) results ∗







Weighted mean 1.8259 2.0934 1.3786 1.4008
Maximum (min. eﬃciency) 3.9459 4.5140 2.5344 2.6080
Minimum (max. eﬃciency) 1.0000 1.1597 1.0000 1.0024







Weighted mean 1.3396 1.4289 1.5202 1.5401
Maximum (min. eﬃciency) 3.3012 3.4616 3.3123 3.4603
Minimum (max. eﬃciency) 1.0000 1.0728 1.0000 1.0017
∗All estimates are made with FEAR, a package for frontier eﬃciency analysis with R (Wilson, 2005).
For Model I, the estimated bias-corrected distance function value of 2.0934 for the
integrated ﬁrms implies that, on average, the same output quantity could have been
produced despite reducing the input usage by more than 52 percent.15 Model II, where
a monetary value OPEX is used instead of the physical variables number of employees
and number of rolling stock, shows a much lower bias-corrected distance function value
(1.4289), indicating a possible input reduction of about 30 percent on average. Given
the problem of physical measures – neglecting diﬀerences in relative factor prices among
14 Since full data coverage over the observation period is not given for all integrated ﬁrms, all average
distance function values of the integrated ﬁrms are weighted by the number of observations per ﬁrm.
15 The possible input reduction is calculated by 1 – (1/distance value).
17countries – we consider the estimated function of Model II as a better approximation of
the real production technology.16
Table 5 shows the bias-corrected distance function results for the integrated ﬁrms in
Model I. Both distance values, in respect to their own frontier (2.0934) and to the sepa-
rated frontier (2.2134), indicate a high level of ineﬃciency, suggesting a possible reduction
of about 52 percent (55 percent) in inputs, on average, to reach the integrated (separated)
eﬃciency frontier. The average ratio of the distance function values, measuring the dis-
tance between the two frontiers, is slightly greater than unity (1.0854).17 This suggests
that, on average, an eﬃcient integrated ﬁrm needs about 9 percent less inputs than a
”virtually” integrated ﬁrm operating on the ”virtually” integrated frontier. This result
can be interpreted as economies of scope of about 9 percent. Nevertheless, since individual
economies (diseconomies) of scope may vary widely because of the input/output mix, a
judgement using only the average parameter values could be mislead-ing. Still, separating
the observations into two groups, with an individual ratio of the distance function values
greater than unity indicating economies of scope and below unity indicating diseconomies
of scope, identiﬁes economies for 42 observations (56 percent) and diseconomies of scope
for 33 observations (44 percent). On the ﬁrm level, the results are similar: 13 ﬁrms (57
percent) exhibit economies and 10 ﬁrms (43 percent) exhibit diseconomies of scope.
For Model II (Table 6), the estimated distance function values, in respect to both
the integrated frontier (1.4289) and to the separated frontier (1.2447), indicate that, on
average, an integrated ﬁrm may reduce its inputs by about 30 percent (20 percent) to reach
the integrated (separated) eﬃciency frontier. The average ratio of the distance function
values (1.4045) is greater than that in Model I, implying increasing economies of scope of
about 40 percent, on average, when OPEX is considered instead of the physical measures
number of employees and rolling stock. In addition, separating the sample into two groups,
depending on whether their individual ratios of the distance function values are greater
than or less than unity, reveals that 51 observations (70 percent) show economies of scope
and 22 observations (30 percent) show diseconomies of scope. Separating the sample into
groups related to the ﬁrm level results in 15 ﬁrms (65 percent) that indicate economies
16 To control for structural diﬀerences among the countries, we estimated a truncated regression and
regressed the eﬃciency scores of the integrated companies upon GDP per capita, network density and
population density. Model I results showed a signiﬁcant and positive but small inﬂuence of GDP per
capita. For Model II, none of the variables had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the eﬃciency scores.
17 Note that the average ratio of the distance function values is the average of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ratios
of the distance function values, not the ratio of the average distance function values displayed in the
table. The latter would lead to an incorrect conclusion since it relates two diﬀerent operating points
to each other: the operating point referring to the average distance function value in respect to the
own frontier and the operating point referring to the average distance function value in respect to the
separated frontier. This ratio does not measure the distance between the frontiers.
18Table 5: Bias-corrected distance function (eﬃciency) results – Model I
Integrated ﬁrms





Weighted mean 2.0934 2.2134 1.0854 0.7777 1.3221
Maximum 4.5140 4.8501 1.8848 0.9994 1.8848
Minimum 1.1597 0.6804 0.3686 0.3686 1.0076
No. of observations
75 33 42
(100 percent) (44 percent) (56 percent)
No. of ﬁrms
23 10 13
(100 percent) (43 percent) (57 percent)
and 8 ﬁrms (35 percent) that indicate diseconomies of scope. Hence, compared to Model
I, a higher proportion of observations (ﬁrms) show economies of scope.18
Concerning the question which integrated railway ﬁrms exhibit economies or disec-
onomies of scope, both models provide similar results. Economies of scope are identiﬁed
for integrated ﬁrms from 10 countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Estland, Germany, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania and Switzerland) and diseconomies can be found for
integrated ﬁrms from 5 countries (Greece, Ireland, Spain, Slowakia and the Czech Re-
public). The results of the two models diﬀer for ﬁrms from Austria, Poland and Hungary
only. In contrast to Model I, Model II also identiﬁes economies of scope for integrated
ﬁrms from Austria and Poland and diseconomies of scope for the largest integrated ﬁrm
from Hungary.
18 Scale diﬀerences among the integrated ﬁrms and ”virtually” integrated ﬁrms and possible related
diﬀerences in returns to scale do not cause an upward bias in our economies of scope estimations. We
estimated the returns to scale of the integrated ﬁrms by using the scale eﬃciency method (see for instance
F¨ are et al., 1994). Under the output-oriented approach, which conditions the scale properties on the
input vector, we found decreasing returns to scale, on average, indicating a too large input-vector for
the majority of the ﬁrms. Furthermore, considering that scale ineﬃciency is due to decreasing returns to
scale, a signiﬁcant but small negative correlation between scale ineﬃciency and economies of scope can
be shown. Therefore, on average, a possible bias of the estimated scope economies of the integrated ﬁrms
only applies as a downward bias, aﬀecting the economies of scope negatively, if at all.
19Table 6: Bias-corrected distance function (eﬃciency) results - Model II
Integrated ﬁrms





Weighted mean 1.4289 1.2447 1.4045 0.7418 1.7085
Maximum 3.4616 2.6297 4.0851 0.9963 4.0851
Minimum 1.0728 0.2781 0.6007 0.6007 1.0170
No. of observations
73 22 51
(100 percent) (30 percent) (70 percent)
No. of ﬁrms
23 8 15
(100 percent) (35 percent) (65 percent)
6 Conclusions
Our analysis of a sample of 54 railway companies from 27 European countries observed
over the ﬁve-year period from 2000 to 2004 provides the ﬁrst pan-European distance
function approach addressing economies of scope in railways, conﬁrming previous ﬁndings
from the U.S. (Bitzan, 2003; Ivaldi and McCullough, 2004). Within a model using only
physical measures, we ﬁnd slight eﬃciency advantages for integrated companies on average
and economies of scope for a majority of observations. When monetary ﬁgures – or, more
precisely, operating expenses, – are included in a second model even more explicit results
are produced, showing that integrated railway companies are, on average, relatively more
eﬃcient than ”virtually” integrated companies and that a majority (65 percent) of the
railway companies observed indicate economies of scope.
Concerning possible explanations for the heterogeneous ﬁndings on the existence of
economies of scope, our results on integrated ﬁrms from Greece, Ireland, Spain, Slovakia,
Hungary and the Czech Republic are interesting. According to a study from IBM on the
opening of the rail markets in Europe in 2004 (IBM, 2004) Spain, Greece and Ireland
showed the lowest degree of market opening among all European countries. Interestingly
enough, integrated ﬁrms from these countries feature diseconomies of scope or – in a
broader context – low eﬃciency scores. For these ﬁrms, one might interpret the nominal
absence of economies of scope rather as managerial ineﬃciency resulting from a lack of
competitive pressure. Up to a certain extent, the diseconomies of scope or comparably
low eﬃciency of integrated ﬁrms from Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia support
this hypothesis. Although these countries showed a slightly higher degree of market
20opening, they still were assigned to the group with a ”delayed status of market opening”
(IBM, 2004). Conﬁrming this interpretation, all integrated ﬁrms from countries which
were assigned to the group being ”on schedule market opening” (Germany, Italy and
Switzerland) show economies of scope in our analysis. To sum up, a careful glance at
the regulatory environment lets us suggest a reinterpretation of our empirical ﬁndings:
those integrated ﬁrms that are subject to competition do not signiﬁcantly suﬀer from
managerial ineﬃciency and are able to generate productivity advantages as a result of
economies of scope.
However, since we also ﬁnd economies of scope for integrated ﬁrms from countries,
which showed a relatively low degree of market opening, other factors, such as privatiza-
tion, the experience with competitive markets or the proportion of passenger and freight
transport within the total transport operations might be taken into account as well. For
example, our result that the vertically integrated national railway in Estonia exhibits
economies of scope could possibly be explained by its privatization in 2001.
Despite these results, the policy implications still remain ambiguous; indeed, economies
of scope exist for a majority of integrated European railway companies. Future sector re-
structuring should take that issue into consideration to avoid increasing transaction costs
unnecessarily. On the other hand, not disentangling the railway sector retains discrimi-
natory incentives and complicates regulation. Policy makers should carefully weigh the
positive and negative aspects of vertical integration in railways.
Further research on economies of scope in the European railway industry should ad-
dress the character and source of economies of scope in detail, i.e., answer questions
related to whether economies of scope arise mainly between infrastructure and operations
(vertical economies) or also between diﬀerent types of operations (horizontal economies).
Furthermore, future studies should consider the dynamic aspects of market liberalization
and productivity development, particularly a company’s regulatory environment and its
experience, which could have a signiﬁcant impact on relative eﬃciency. Finally, aspects of
railway safety and quality of service should be incorporated in order to control for issues
of particular importance that are probably negatively correlated with a company’s level
of cost.
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